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According to the common sense, experts, backed up by scientific methods, describe the “possible
states of the world” in a value-neutral way. Then, in the political arena, delegates build on these pro-
posals, but also consider values and interests. The present paper attempts to revise such an under-
standing of local economic development (LED) and argues that many of the deficiencies deriving
from such a view can be remedied by deliberative participation, which is not merely a theoretical ne-
cessity, but also a practical possibility.
With regard to the issue of public participation and deliberation, the paper identifies two main
approaches in the LED literature: the “political” and the “apolitical”, of which the latter is mainly
characterised by economic theorising. We take a closer look at the “apolitical” approach and dem-
onstrate that in fact it is very much political. Therefore, we call for the transgression of the border-
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line between politics and expertise in LED, and suggest a joint democratisation of these interrelated
terrains. We argue that deliberative participation is able to contribute to the quality of both the expert
proposals and the working of the politics.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Modern societies are characterised by double delegation. With regard to the pro-
duction of “valid” knowledge, society is divided into experts (specialists) and
laypersons. In connection with the construction of the collective will, there are
delegates (representatives) and citizens (Callon et al. 2011). This double divide
serves as a general framework for public policy-making, at least in standard cases.
According to the common sense, experts, backed up by scientific methodology,
develop policy proposals. The objective of these proposals is to depict the “possi-
ble states of the world” (an accurate state of the present situation and the possible
futures) in a value-neutral way. Then, in the political arena, delegates build on
these proposals, but also consider values and interests (the collective will) and
make decisions.
In recent decades, both of the above-mentioned delegations have been chal-
lenged in theory as well as in practice. On the one hand, experts’ ability to inform
the political arena in an accurate and value-neutral way has been questioned
(Funtowitz – Ravetz 1993; Witt 2003; Ravetz 2004; Lidskog 2008). On the other
hand, the idea that the collective will is the aggregation of individual preferences,
through delegation, voting, or other procedures of that ilk, has also been contested
(Sen 1999a; Dryzek 2000; Callon et al. 2011).
In the present paper we argue that there is a necessity as well as an actual possi-
bility to overcome these divides in local economic development (LED) through
public participation and deliberation. We identify different approaches to LED
that we shall call “political” and “apolitical”. We argue that economic theorising
on LED mainly belongs to the so-called “apolitical” approach, in which the issue
of public participation and deliberation is simply by-passed.
Building on welfare economics concepts, we conclude that this neglect cannot
be sustained. Should we take a closer look, the “apolitical” approach will reveal it-
self to be “political” indeed. We argue that whatever approach we take to LED, in
case we formulate any kind of policy conclusions or claim that we are able to de-
pict the possible states of the world, than we must deal with the issue of participa-
tion and deliberation. We also claim that both delegations should be overcome,
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and necessarily at a go, since they are strongly connected. Moreover, it is not sim-
ply participation, but deliberative participation that matters.
We consider deliberation to be a “debate and discussion aimed at producing
reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise
preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow
participants” (Chambers 2003: 309). We understand deliberation as a form of dis-
cursive participation, where individuals can develop and express their views,
learn the positions of others, and have the opportunity to revise their convictions
and values in political decision-making. We distinguish this discursive participa-
tion from other forms of political participation such as voting, volunteering, pro-
testing, or direct problem solving through community organisations. These kinds
of political engagements only attempt to expand the ex ante given preferences that
are considered in decision-making, but do not provide an opportunity to discuss or
form them.1
In Section 2, we review the literature of LED from the aspect of public partici-
pation and identify two characteristic approaches: the “political” and the “apoliti-
cal”. We argue that economic theorising on LED mainly belongs to the latter,
therefore we proceed along this approach. In Section 3, we argue for the necessity
of deliberative participation in LED. In Section 4, we attempt to show that public
participation is not only necessary, but also possible both in theory and in practice.
Finally, we draw our conclusions.
2. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE LITERATURE
In a very general sense, local economic development means deliberate interven-
tion into the local economic processes in order to make residents better off
(Lengyel 2004; Swinburn et al. 2006; Bajmócy 2011). We believe that it is useful
to identify two main approaches in the LED literature that we shall call the “politi-
cal” and the “apolitical” (Table 1).
Within the political approach, economic development – explicitly or implic-
itly – is considered to be one of the many potential issues in the local political
arena. While it is often noted that economic considerations tend to outweigh other
aspects (Cox 1995), they are still debatable on the ground of interests, power rela-
tions, or values. This stream of literature is interested in both the content (inform-
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1 Public participation in general may accept the conventional presumption that social choices
are made by independent individuals with ex ante given, constant preferences and that these
preferences have to be aggregated or “represented” throughout the decision-making proce-
dure. Deliberation (or discursive participation) does not accept this assumption. In this case,
the construction of collective decisions is not simply a matter of aggregation.
ing) of LED interventions and the process through which they are formed. This
approach provides a natural ground for debates on public participation and delib-
eration.
Most of the time, these debates evolve alongside the “representative vs.
participative” democracy dichotomy. It is often argued that policy-making or the
workings of the democracy may be made more effective through participation and
deliberation (Arnstein 1969; Dryzek 2000; OECD 2001; Cheema – Rondinelli
2007). Participation provides opportunities for learning, and because the sense of
democracy is not an innate gift, it has to be learnt and practiced (Cooke 2000).
Community formation is facilitated by participation: in open public debates, peo-
ple are forced to argue as members of the community (Cooke 2000; Pataki 2004).
Participation enables the transparency of governance and serves as a control of the
bureaucratic state apparatus (OECD 2001; Csanádi et al. 2010). The resources of
many local actors can be mobilised, trust and devotion towards decisions also in-
crease and, therefore, later conflicts can be avoided (Cooke 2000; Szirmai –
Szépvölgyi 2007; Földi 2009; Reisinger 2010).
Certainly, there are counter-arguments as well: participation is costly and
time-consuming, it may increase the number of power-conflicts, and though it
may advance consensus, it does not necessarily result in one. Certain groups can
be better equipped for participation, which may result in the emergence of a sec-
ondary elite, and in this case, it is not obvious whom they represent and by what
sort of authorisation2 (Burns 2000; Taylor 2007; Csanádi et al. 2010; Maier 2011).
This stream of literature also touches upon the “expert vs. lay” dichotomy; how-
ever, it seems to be less express and the role of the lay is fundamentally the revi-
sion of expert proposals with regard to the risks they involve and the right to de-
cline them.3
There also exists another approach to LED, which can be called the apolitical
approach. In this case, the focus is exclusively on the content of the intervention.
This stream focuses on the informing of LED. This body of literature is character-
ised to a large extent by economic theorising on the development patterns of re-
gional and local economies (e.g. regional growth and competitiveness models,
territorial innovation models, spatiality of technological change, restructuring of
local economies or regional disparities). In this case, the proposed policy is de-
duced from the theories in a seemingly value-neutral way. The issue of public par-
ticipation and deliberation is beyond the scope of this approach.
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2 It must be mentioned that neither the advantages, nor the disadvantages occur inevitably, and
that the above-mentioned criticisms are not necessarily identified as problems (e.g. Bodorkós
2010).
3 However, there are also exceptions, where laypersons have a role in knowledge generation as
well (Bodorkós – Pataki 2009).
A subtle way, however, does exist within this approach to consider the impor-
tance of public participation. The active engagement of local actors in public af-
fairs is often considered to be an element of social capital. Probably, the most
well-known and most intensely theorised cases are the industrial districts of Italy
(Markusen 1996; Storper – Salais 1997). In this way, participation can be incorpo-
rated into economic theories (models) as a contributing factor of economic devel-
opment (growth or competitiveness). Nevertheless, the issue remains marginal.
The two approaches cannot always be easily separated. Many comprehensive
works on regional and local economic development encompass both aspects to a
certain extent (Blakely – Bradshaw 2002; Pike et al. 2006, 2011; Rechnitzer 2007;
Fekete 2008). However, while economic theorising is the gist of the apolitical ap-
proach, it is merely a form of the possible knowledge sources in the political ap-
proach.
In the following sections, we first attempt to show that the apolitical approach
is not value-neutral and hence it is indeed political. Then we shall advocate an ap-
proach in which public participation (supplemented by deliberation) is not re-
stricted to the ordinary political arena, and lay and citizen participation goes hand
in hand (the sharp distinction between these two aspects becomes irrelevant).
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Table 1
Different theoretical approaches to local economic development
Political approach Apolitical approach
Main characteristics Economic development is considered Economic theorising on the
to be a very important aspect among patterns of local development,
the many potential issues in the local and drawing policy conclusions
political arena from that
Main focus Both the forming and informing of Informing policy-making
LED (drawing policy conclusions (depicting the possible states of the
and analysing the operation of the world in a value-neutral way)
local political arena)
Background Various fields of regional science Economic theorising on local
development patterns
The issue of public Present in the literature: Largely neglected
participation – representative vs. participatory (might be considered as a
democracy dichotomy contributing factor to
– expert vs. lay dichotomy development/growth)
3. THE NECESSITY OF DELIBERATIVE PARTICIPATION
It seems to be generally accepted that the ultimate objective of LED is to enhance
the “quality of life”, the “standard of living”, the “welfare”, or the “well-being”4
of local residents – in short, to make them better off (Lengyel 2004; Pike et al.
2006; Swinburn et al. 2006; Bajmócy 2011). However, the literature of LED de-
votes surprisingly little attention to the clarification of the ultimate goal. That is
exactly what we attempt to analyse in this section.
All economic development approaches must have their answers to the question
of why one particular situation is considered to be more desirable for the commu-
nity than another one. Without this criterion, the objectives and effects of a possi-
ble intervention cannot be interpreted. One could hardly argue for a LED policy
that results in a situation that is less desirable for the community than the existing
state.
LED can affect individuals in numerous ways and to different extents. It is
quite common in practice that the gains and the burdens of alternative policies fall
on different groups. For example, we may say that Policy 1 benefits A and harms
B, while Policy 2 benefits B and harms A (Policy 2 may be also understood as a
situation without any policy interventions). In this case, there is no way of decid-
ing which choice is better unless one can compare to what extent A and B are
benefited and harmed. In other words, there is a need for an interpersonal com-
parison of gains and losses.
But how can we decide whether a policy is desirable or not, how can interper-
sonal comparison be performed, and what exactly should be compared? These
questions have been in the focus of welfare economics for a long time. A number
of possible answers have been proposed, which vary in terms of at least two char-
acteristics (Table 2):
– How collective judgement is derived from individual gains and losses (how
interpersonal comparison is carried out)?
– What set of information is needed to claim that an individual has benefited
(/ remained in an unvaried position / was harmed)?
The simplest case is when there is no need for interpersonal comparison, be-
cause everyone gains at the same time. This is the “growth makes everyone
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4 The use of these concepts is not clear-cut in the literature. In several cases, “quality of life”,
“welfare”, or “well-being” seem to be synonyms. However, these concepts are used for quite
different purposes. We will elaborate on this in Section 3.2.
richer” argument.5 The second approach accepts that there is a need for interper-
sonal comparison, and has an easy and seemingly value-neutral way to carry it
out.
The theory and practice of LED is dominated by these two approaches. How-
ever, there is a third approach, in favour of which we are arguing in this paper.
This also considers interpersonal comparison to be inevitable, but does not accept
that external observers have an easy way to carry it out. Deliberative participation
is necessary to compare gains and losses.
Beyond the problem of interpersonal comparison, all approaches must answer
another (though related) question as well, which concerns the set of information
they use (or exclude) to decide on the meaning of gain and loss. According to Sen
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Table 2
Possible welfare economics approaches behind LED
Everyone gains The comparison of The comparison of
gains and losses is gains and losses is
possible and evident possible, but complex
The necessity of interpersonal Unnecessary Necessary Necessary
comparison of gains and losses
How interpersonal comparison – Gains and losses are Through open public
is carried out brought to a common debates
denominator (e.g. real (participatory and
income, primary deliberative
goods) process)
Are external observers able to Yes Yes No
decide whether a shift is
desirable for the community
The informational basis of the Utility, real Real income (used as a Capabilities
evaluative judgement income proxy for utility),
Primary goods
5 We are not providing an in-depth analysis on this approach. First, we think that economic
change is mostly characterised by shifts that create losers as well. This is a direct consequence
of the “creative destruction” lying behind technological change (Schumpeter 1950), which is
considered to be the main driver of economic change. Second, even if everyone becomes
“richer”, it does not necessarily mean that everyone actually perceives improvement in their
positions. Several empirical studies have shown that people compare their positions to certain
reference groups (Layard 2006; Costanza et al. 2007). Therefore, even if nobody is actually
becoming poorer, growing inequalities may result in the worsening of certain individuals’ po-
sition. Third, regardless of the adequacy of the above arguments, the problems we are demon-
strating about the informational basis of utilitarian and real income-based evaluation in the fol-
lowing, makes this approach questionable.
(1995: 73), “the informational basis of a judgement identifies the information on
which the judgement is directly dependent and – no less importantly – asserts that
the truth and falsehood of any other type of information cannot directly influence
the correctness of the judgement”.
3.1. The information basis of approaches focusing on “welfare”
The starting point of current approaches is that the concept of good may be differ-
ent for different individuals, and it is hard to reconcile them (Rawls 1982;
Hausman – McPherson 1996; Sen 1999a). Within such a framework, one funda-
mental question is what can serve as a basis for the comparison of different indi-
viduals’ positions (Rawls 1982), how can the social desirability of an economic
development intervention be judged?
A standard answer is provided by utilitarianism (or welfarism). Certain utili-
tarian theories regard utility as a mental state, something that makes interpersonal
comparison quite problematic. Following the influential arguments of Robbins
(1938), utility is generally interpreted as a numerical representation of preference
satisfaction. Within utilitarianism, there have been lively debates on the possibil-
ity of interpersonal comparison providing such a definition for welfare, and
whether it can be carried out while being an external observer (Hicks 1939;
Kaldor 1939; Harsanyi 1955; Binmore 1989).6
Welfarism has two merits: it is easy to formalise and to build mathematical
models on this basis. Additionally, this approach does not place any constraints on
what a rational individual may prefer. For this reason, economists can be neutral
about the content of the individual’s preferences (de gustibus non est disputan-
dum).
But the utilitarian approach suffers from several problems (Hausman –
McPherson 1996). One of these is that preferences may change and may even be
the consequences of manipulation. People may adapt to their disadvantageous po-
sition (Sen 1999a), and so their desires are in line with their detrimental situation.
Moreover, tastes may be expensive or offensive. For example, while some people
are satisfied with eating cheap food, others are distraught without extraordinary
and expensive goods (Rawls 1971; Cohen 1993). And there exist preferences that
are satisfied by worsening others’ positions (sadism, racism, etc.).
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6 Probably the most common answers are either to simply by-pass the issue by stressing
Pareto-efficient shifts (Hausman – McPherson 1996), or to use the double criteria suggested by
Kaldor (1939), Hicks (1939), and Scitovszky (1941). This latter, in turn, presupposes that
gains and losses can be brought to a common denominator (most likely money).
Furthermore, should the standard interpretation of utility be taken literally, we
could not make a difference between the satisfaction of past (currently non-exist-
ing) and current preferences (Hausman – McPherson 1996). But what might be
even more important is that utilitarian evaluation focuses solely on welfare conse-
quences and neglects a bunch of aspects that one may have a “reason to value”
such as rights or freedoms for instance. Therefore, in the welfarist approach, the
informational basis of the evaluation shrinks considerably (Sen 1999a). Apart
from the possessed goods, any other potentially valuable aspect such as access to
public services, personal abilities, rights and freedom is given a weight of zero.
In empirical works, it is quite problematic to grasp utility directly and therefore
economists characteristically rely on certain “proxies”, most often on real income.
In most cases, it is widely acknowledged (even by orthodox authors) that it is an
imperfect proxy, which is a compromise with data limitations (Hausman –
McPherson 1996).
However, the use of real income as a proxy for welfare has a strong value con-
tent and is problematic in several respects (Sen 1979; Hausman – McPherson
1996). Actually, it compares “willingness to pay” instead of real welfare gains and
losses. There is a bias against the preferences of the poor. This derives from the
fact that preferences are weighted in money and the poor’s willingness to pay may
be different from the rich’s because the former has less income to spend. The pre-
sumption that the same amount of income (and, indirectly, the same amount of
goods) provide the same utility for everyone is arbitrary. This would not be the
case even if we assumed that everyone has the same preferences (Sen 1999a).
Therefore, this approach has a strong value content in the sense that it presupposes
that increased consumption makes everyone better off. On top of this, it avoids
neither the problem of interpersonal comparison, nor of social evaluation.
Therefore, we think that all the approaches that focus on growth (or competi-
tiveness) as the main objectives of local economic development rely on an infor-
mational basis that is too narrow. They are also characterised by strong (implicit)
value contents. But these value commitments remain hidden, covered by the pre-
tence of neutrality, and cannot therefore be negotiated.
3.2. The informational basis of approaches focusing on well-being
Among the concepts that criticise welfarism, Rawls’s (1971) theory of justice
(and, as a component, the concept of primary goods) and the capability approach
proposed by Sen (1999a) and Nussbaum (2000) have become the most influential.
According to Rawls (1971, 2003), irrespective of the individual’s concept of
good life, there are certain (very similar) things that all individuals require to fur-
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ther their ends, no matter what else they require. These primary goods are useful
for the realisation of any objectives (Rawls 1982). Therefore, the comparison of
different individuals’ positions should rest on the amount of the primary goods
they possess. Such primary goods are basic liberties, freedom of movement and
choice of occupation, powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of respon-
sibility, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect (Rawls 1982,
2003). This approach is more neutral than welfarism in the sense that it does not
have to deal with subjective preferences or mental states, merely with primary
goods considered to be objective.
The concept of primary goods is considered to be impartial because everybody
requires these goods, regardless of what else they require in life. But as Sen (1982,
1993) points out, these goods are not equally, objectively good for every member
of society. According to his argument, the way we can actually use our means de-
pends on several circumstances (conversion factors) that can be personal or social
(Sen 1999a):
– personal heterogeneities (illness, age, etc.),
– environmental diversities (how much resources we need for heating, cloth-
ing, or for defence against natural disasters, etc.),
– accessibility and quality of public services,
– differences in relational perspectives (to what reference group we compare
our position),
– distribution within the family.
Possessed goods and the above circumstances jointly determine what objective
can be actually achieved by a given individual. Possessed primary goods are not
equally useful for every member of society. Thus, this concept also has unques-
tioned, implicit value commitments when stating that primary goods are equally
good for everybody. Sen (1999a) argues that this approach has a narrow informa-
tional basis in virtue of neglecting conversion factors and being insensitive to con-
sequences, namely the aims that can actually be realised by the goods. Criticising
both of the above-mentioned concepts, Sen moulded his capability approach. Ac-
cording to Sen, neither utility, nor primary goods constitute the adequate space for
evaluation.
One of the most important notions of the capability approach is functioning.
Functionings are the “doings and beings” of life that a person has reason to value.
These can be very simple things such as being well-nourished, healthy, or able to
move. They can also be more complex ones, like being educated, taking part in the
life of the community, or having self-respect (Sen 1999a).
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The notion of capability refers to the real opportunities (functionings) available
to individuals in the sense that the given individual has both the means and the
ability to convert them into things he has a reason to value. Thus, capabilities are a
set of functionings that a person can actually achieve in the society. The achieved
functionings are not equivalent to the well-being of a person or of the society be-
cause opportunities that could be, but are not actually chosen may be valued as
well (Sen 1993, 1999a).
Carrying out evaluations in the space of capabilities has several advantages
compared to other approaches of interpersonal comparison. First, the obvious ad-
vantage of the capability approach is that it inevitably makes us realise the neces-
sity of value-choices and it also makes them explicit. In the evaluation process, the
community has to specify the set of valuable functionings and their relative im-
portance. In Sen’s (1999a) view, this designation must occur through reasoned,
social scrutiny (through deliberative processes). Therefore, in this approach, it is
obvious that the evaluation cannot be carried out without open public debates (by
external observers).
Furthermore, Sen also points out that when we choose capabilities as the infor-
mational basis of evaluation, participation and deliberation become valuable per
se, and not only as means. Open public debates can be valued even in those cases
when we do not actually participate in them.
The second advantage of the capability approach is that its informational basis
may be able to embrace the missing elements of the alternative approaches. In the
capability approach, a policy-maker has to give attention to freedoms and rights,
to the circumstances of achieving goals, and has to scrutinise the possible social
goals, instead of simply accepting them as implicit presumptions. The conse-
quences are twofold:
– First, the cited approaches of interpersonal comparison differ in the depth of
their informational bases. If we accept that the wider the set of relevant in-
formation it builds on, the better the evaluative process (in an ethical sense),
than we have to argue that the capability approach is the best alternative for
interpersonal comparison in the current literature.
– Second, all the approaches of interpersonal comparison are value-laden in
the sense that they have presumptions about what well-being is for individu-
als. The difference is that the capability approach makes these value-choices
explicit.
To conclude this section, we can state that the common understanding of local
development policy-making must be revised. Expert proposals are value-commit-
ted due to carrying out interpersonal comparison and choosing an informational
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basis. Hence, they contain elements that are usually considered to be political. As
a consequence, it is not just the political arena where values and interests are artic-
ulated.
It is crucial to see that the framework provided by the capability approach
equally challenges the shortcomings of expert proposals and of political delegation.
In the process of public deliberation, the contributions of participants are twofold.
On the one hand, they possess knowledge that is vital for designing, implementing,
and evaluating policies (a terrain conventionally dominated by experts). On the
other hand, they negotiate values and interests, and may assign value to the very fact
that open public debates do take place (and these are political acts).
Therefore, the lack of public participation and deliberation in LED results in
experts’ reduced ability to carry out their task (by disregarding a set of knowledge
crucial to designing, implementing, or evaluating policies). Besides, it furnishes
expert proposal with a strong implicit political content, which, due to its invisibil-
ity, cannot be subjected to public debates. This, in turn, worsens the operation of
the political arena.
4. THE POSSIBILITIES OF DELIBERATIVE PARTICIPATION
Both the literature of political science and the practice of development programs
suggest that there has been a general shift towards participatory approaches since
the late 1980s and early 1990s (Chambers 2003). In development studies, the idea
of including citizens in policy-making emerges from time to time, especially in
low-income countries where, in many cases, one of the main objectives is exactly
to foster participation amongst the recipients of the development programs
(Crocker 2007).
Nevertheless, arguments in favour of public participation and deliberation nec-
essarily give way to scepticism with regard to the practical implementation. These
counter-arguments are either theoretical (in the sense that they question the possi-
bility of arriving at consequent results through participatory processes), or prag-
matic (in the sense that they basically accept the importance of participation and
deliberation, but are puzzled about how to design and implement such processes).
Therefore, it is necessary to further investigate the advantages and disadvan-
tages associated with participation. We have already touched upon this issue in
the second section; however, our aim is slightly different here. We believe that
practical difficulties cannot justify the avoidance of deliberative participation de-
picted in Section 3. This does not mean that the difficulties are not relevant. On the
contrary, they should be scrutinised, and that can serve as an incentive for refining
the existing techniques and creating more enabling institutions.
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4.1. Advantages and disadvantages of deliberative participation
One very important theoretical question is whether social choices can actually
lead to consequent results – does expansive participation make decisions a priori
impossible? In this respect, Arrow’s (1950) impossibility theorem induced a
fairly pessimistic mood in economics.
First of all, we would like to make an important distinction between delibera-
tive participation and the simple aggregation of preferences (e.g. voting). We be-
lieve that this distinction makes many objections about participation powerless.
The central tenet of deliberative participation is that it can transform opinions,
change minds and make values explicit (Chambers 2003). It is a process of free
and rational will formation, in which participants offer each other their best argu-
ments either in defence of their opinions, proposals or suggestions, or against
those of others. Citizens engage in that process with a disposition to change their
minds if persuaded by others (Besson – Martí 2006). Therefore, deliberation must
be distinguished from other patterns of communication based on irrational persua-
sion or the employment of coercion and threats.
Deliberation essentially differs from voting. The gist of deliberation presup-
poses the ideal aim of convincing others, while the logic of pure voting remains
indifferent to any interaction or communication among voters (Besson – Martí
2006). The social choice theories emphasise the role of voting (aggregation of
preferences) as a way of building a collective set of preferences to be maximised.
Besson – Martí (2006) use the expressive term “economic theories of democracy”
for these approaches.
As a consequence, the problems associated with vote-oriented decision-mak-
ing do not apply in case of deliberative participation, because they hold true only
in the case of certain axiomatic presumptions (e.g. economic theory of democ-
racy) and not with regard to reasoned deliberation (Sen 1999b). Local economic
development does not characteristically deal with vote-oriented problems: neither
the assessment of the region’s welfare situation, nor everyday policy-making is
such. In these cases, reconciliation and the approximation of arguments are possi-
ble.
It must also be emphasised that in many cases, expectations towards social
choices are exaggerated. Partial comparison or less accurate decisions are fre-
quently adequate. For example, in order to prevent poverty, we do not have to find
the most equitable allocation of incomes (Sen 1999a, b).
However, a number of pragmatic problems may still hold true. Some of the
most important criticisms are the following (Chambers 2003; Carpini et al. 2004;
Besson – Martí 2006; Crocker 2007):
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– It might be suggested that citizen participation in local policy issues should
not be encouraged because it will be dominated by parochial attitudes (“not
in my backyard” problem).
– Majority of citizens lack the skills and/or opportunities to deliberate effec-
tively.
– Deliberation can be subject to conscious manipulation and unconscious
bias.
– The asymmetries in power, social, or economic status can be reproduced in
deliberative participation processes.
– The past hierarchical traditions of a society overwrite the assumption of free
and equal citizens.
– Deliberative participation is too utopian or idealistic, and too far removed
from actual world conditions. For instance, time constraints imply that we
have to bring our deliberations close to voting.
– Uncertainty and complexity might make deliberative social decisions
a priori impossible. Within such situations, the effects of conscious at-
tempts to induce change are partially unforeseeable. Chance, “small histori-
cal events” reinforced by positive feedback mechanisms, and “unforeseen
side effects” may have a considerable role.
The weight and seriousness of these problems associated with participation
and deliberation is strongly contested in the literature. However, it must be seen
that the above critiques also hold true for local development policy-making prac-
tices that do not rely on public participation and deliberation.
The “double delegation” peculiar to current policy-making can also be accused
of being biased and influenced by asymmetries of power. The real opportunities to
articulate preferences are not equal, and uncertainties make effects partly unpredict-
able. Delegation is also idealistic in the sense that the arguments of the delegates
would be simple representations of citizens’ preferences (Callon et al. 2011).
Certainly, these do not prevent us from carrying out participatory processes
that are actually characterised by the above problems. However, empirical evi-
dence often reveals that the alleged detrimental effects of deliberative participa-
tion either do not appear, or happen to be less intense than assumed; in many
cases, they dwindle through better institutional design (Carpini et al. 2004;
Crocker 2007). On the other hand, deliberative participation has the potential to
provide real advantages for local economic development. First of all, people who
deliberate are more enlightened about their own and other’s needs and experience,
and have the opportunity to express value-commitments. As a consequence, de-
liberation is able to encompass additional considerations and facilitate more in-
formed policy decision. Hence, it can be considered as a mode of policy-learning.
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Collective decisions made through deliberation may be superior to individual
decisions and self-interest in the sense that participants may accept the outcome
even if it does not fully reflect their view. In empirical studies, participants agreed
that the recommendations concerning a given project (developed through a delib-
erative process) reflected the consensus of the group, even when these recommen-
dations did not reflect their own personal view (Carpini et al. 2004).7
In line with Sen’s (1993, 1999a) capability approach, deliberation has a signifi-
cance from an opportunity aspect as well. For the practice of deliberative partici-
pation, the task is not necessarily to make decisions through the participation of all
the stakeholders, but to create procedures that provide real opportunity for partici-
pation, irrespective of people’s actual choice to participate or not. Certainly, in
each case, only a part of the affected will exercise their rights, but the fact that they
could actually join the discourse is valuable. As Hibbings – Theiss-Morse (2002:
239) state, “while people are not eager to provide input into political decisions,
they want to know that they could have input into political decisions if they ever
wanted to do so. In fact, they are passionate about this”.
We do not believe that there exists a panacea, which surely provides all the ad-
vantages and remedies for all the above-mentioned problems. However, there ex-
ists a great deal of experience concerning the use of different techniques in varied
situations. It seems that differences in the complexity of the problem or the magni-
tude of stakes call for different participatory techniques (Newmann – Jennings
2008). Becoming acquainted with the experience of other regions and their – per-
haps critical – adaptation may also be practical. In the past few decades, much ex-
perience has been accumulated in connection with successfully implemented par-
ticipatory budgeting, deliberative polling, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences,
and action research initiatives (Smith – Wales 2000; Isaac – Frank 2002; Luskin et
al. 2002; Cabannes 2004; Pataki 2004; Gret – Sintomer 2005; Bodorkós – Pataki
2009). Finally, being aware of the possible pitfalls is also indispensable for refin-
ing participatory and deliberative processes in practice.
4.2. Lessons from the case of Novos Alagados
Let us finally provide a secondary analysis of a case study in order to clarify our
arguments on the importance of the informational basis and on the necessity of de-
liberative participation. We shall analyse the case of Novos Alagados (Brazil),
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7 This does not infer that deliberative participation is incompatible with self-interest. In fact, the
denial of self-interested motivations can lead to suboptimal situations compared to open mani-
festation of self-interested claims (Besson – Martí 2006).
where a World Bank initiative took place. Therefore, this case combines a great
deal of the existing scientific and practical knowledge with the special
Latin-American ambience that generally favours public participation. The case
has been meticulously analysed by Frediani (2007) and Imparato – Ruster (2003).
There is a long-standing problem about squatter settlements in Brazil. The state
of Bahia in Brazil has been targeted by World Bank loans in order to transform
these settlements into liveable, competitive, well-managed, and bankable cities
since the mid-1990s. In 1992, the state government together with an Italian NGO
started to organise an intervention in an area called Novos Alagados. In 1996, the
pilot project was launched and continued through several steps until 2013. In
2000, the project totalled US$ 60 million; in 2003, the World Bank loaned another
US$ 98 million. According to the World Bank reports, the project has been a great
success in improving living conditions in the area, providing better housing, infra-
structure, and social services. The stilt houses were removed and replaced by new
ones with modern convenience (electricity and water supply, sewage disposal).
As a consequence, the population density has decreased significantly. The project
resulted in the increased income of residents since the new houses were built by
local cooperatives and courses were organised to train electricians and builders.
Still, the effects are controversial. Firstly, the process of individualising houses
is part of the residents’ cultural identity, which reflects social, economic, and po-
litical features. Local residents attach importance to the aesthetic conditions of
their houses and improve them personally (for instance by adding a new story to
the house). But the project did not allow them to expand their houses in order keep
the unified view of the area. Secondly, many of the inhabitants could not afford
the living costs of their new houses to which they were relocated. Compared to the
old stilt houses, the new houses brought significantly increased costs since the
dwellers had to pay for electricity, water, and monthly instalments. As a result,
they began acquiring electricity and water from illegal connections and wells.
Thirdly, the government and the founding agency established a new system of
self-organisation in the area. They created a council consisting of new local lead-
ers, who were selected by the inhabitants of the affected streets. This council regu-
larly negotiated with technicians and government officials. Out of the 49 council
members, only two have remained active. The new structure imposed by outsiders
was unsuccessful because the new leaders were not accepted by the community. It
has obvious implications for the inhabitants’ freedom to participate in deci-
sion-making procedures and their ability to maintain social networks.
This case study is a very instructive example of many of the aspects concerning
public participation and deliberation in local development. On the one hand, it
shows how the chosen informational basis influences the evaluation of the
achievements. On the other, it demonstrates how participation can be ill-inter-
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preted, and how the lack of real deliberative participation (the failure to incorpo-
rate citizen knowledge about local economic circumstances, cultural peculiarities,
and the operation of social networks) led to controversial results.
The evaluation of the World Bank focused on the commodities or means asso-
ciated with a satisfactory standard of living. In our understanding, this is the most
common evaluative space in current local economic development thinking. On
this informational basis, the project was successful: the dwellers were relocated to
new houses with water and electricity supply and sewage disposal, and they had
an autonomous council for organising themselves. At the same time, problems
about financial sustainability, participation, and social dynamics remained hidden
within this evaluative space.
However a broader informational basis easily reveals these aspects. In this
case, our attention is shifted from the provision of means to the real opportunities
of citizens in leading their lives (e.g. being sheltered in a dignified way). Although
people have water, electricity, and sewage disposal in their houses, they do not
have the real opportunity to use them, simply because they do not have sufficient
income to pay for it. Although they have an autonomous council, it is a top-down
structure, and thus the leaders are not acknowledged by the community. There-
fore, they do not have a real opportunity of taking part in decision-making. Al-
though they have an organised cityscape, they are not allowed to expand their
houses, therefore they do not have the opportunity to individualise their homes
and express themselves. As a consequence, they do not have the real opportunity
to use their houses or be sheltered in the appropriate, dignified way.
It is also important to see that the project intended to foster public participation,
but failed to do so because without considering the nature of local social networks,
it could not provide the real opportunity for dwellers to take part in public affairs.
On top of this, participation was meant to occur only in the political sphere (the
expert-lay dichotomy was not challenged). However, the failure to incorporate
local (lay) knowledge into expert work led to serious deficiencies: the impedi-
ments of achieving valuable “doings and beings” with the provided means re-
mained hidden.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Our paper analysed the role of deliberative participation in local economic devel-
opment. We identified two (partially overlapping) approaches in the literature of
LED that we labelled the political and apolitical approaches. We primarily in-
tended to contribute to the discourses taking place within the apolitical approach,
which is mainly characterised by economic theorising.
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We challenged the common-sense way of looking at LED policy-making (i.e.
experts depict the possible states of the world in an accurate and value-neutral
way, and let the political arena negotiate these proposal together with values and
interests). We argue that any attempts in LED to make policy proposals and any
claims about adequately depicting the possible states of the world rely on strong
value commitments. This makes the apolitical approach very much political.
(1) The confrontation with the issue of public participation and deliberation
seems to be inevitable both in the theory and the practice of LED. How-
ever, in doing so, we must move beyond both the expert-lay and the citi-
zen-representative division. We claim that Sen’s capability approach
might be able to provide a framework for LED in which this challenge can
be met.
(2) Public participation must not be seen merely as an act occurring in the po-
litical arena. On the one hand, the articulation of interests and values also
takes place within expert activities. In most cases, however, this remains
hidden and occurs as a consequence of hegemonies – therefore, it cannot
be challenged in open public debates. This, in turn, depreciates the politi-
cal arena. On the other hand, a great extent of knowledge necessary for de-
signing, implementing, and evaluating LED policies is scattered amongst
the local inhabitants (laypersons).
(3) Deliberative participation must not be understood as the simple aggrega-
tion of preferences. Its main tenet is the possibility of will formation
through open public debates, leading to reasoned and informed decisions.
This also implies that in the practical techniques of deliberative participa-
tion, the focus is not on the proportionate representation of the voters, but
on the introduction of as many relevant aspects to the decision-making
process as possible (to widen the informational basis of the evaluative
judgements). Deliberative participation should be seen as a way of pol-
icy-learning.
(4) Speaking in advocacy of deliberative participation is neither an argument
against the importance of expert activities in LED, nor an argument in fa-
vour of unfounded political decisions. The consequence of the limitations
of expert knowledge is that their role is not exclusive. Nevertheless, they
are able to introduce more arguments and counter-arguments to public de-
bates than anyone else. They also have a vital role (and liability) in shaping
the interrelated terrains of the production of valid knowledge and the con-
struction of the collective will.
(5) We accept that the practical implementation of deliberative participation
can be problematic. However, we do believe that this does not justify the
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avoidance of participation neither in theory, nor in practice. First, most of
the deserved and well-funded critiques also apply to the current ways of
policy-making. Second, they do imply that deliberative participation can
be ill-interpreted, but do not imply that it is essentially unable to result in
consequent, valuable results. Third, the very process of deliberative partic-
ipation can be valued regardless of its outcomes. The scrutiny of the poten-
tial pitfalls of deliberative participation should be seen as an incentive to
move towards refined techniques in the practice of LED.
The role of deliberative participation in LED is eventually to attempt to remedy
a number of problems deriving from the “double delegation” lying behind current
policy-making. It rejects the idea of scientising the political arena (which is the
technocratic solution). It also rejects the idea of merely supplementing expert pro-
posals with a certain set of local knowledge, while leaving the political arena un-
touched. It attempts to transgress the strict borderline between the production of
valid knowledge and the construction of the “collective will”, by suggesting a
joint democratisation of these interrelated terrains.
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